Accountability as a Differentiated Value in Supranational Governance by Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg & Beck Jørgensen, Torben
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Accountability as a Differentiated Value in Supranational Governance
Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg; Beck Jørgensen, Torben
Published in:
American Review of Public Administration
DOI:
10.1177/0275074010366300
Publication date:
2010
Document version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Citation for published version (APA):
Martinsen, D. S., & Beck Jørgensen, T. (2010). Accountability as a Differentiated Value in Supranational
Governance. American Review of Public Administration, 40(4), 742-760.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074010366300
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
 http://arp.sagepub.com/
Administration
The American Review of Public
 http://arp.sagepub.com/content/40/6/742
The online version of this article can be found at:
 
DOI: 10.1177/0275074010366300
 2010 40: 742 originally published online 3 May 2010The American Review of Public Administration
Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen and Torben Beck Jørgensen
Accountability as a Differentiated Value in Supranational Governance
 
 
Published by:
 http://www.sagepublications.com
On behalf of:
 
 
 American Society for Public Administration
 can be found at:The American Review of Public AdministrationAdditional services and information for 
 
 
 
 
 
 http://arp.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: 
 
 http://arp.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:  
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: 
 
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: 
 
 http://arp.sagepub.com/content/40/6/742.refs.htmlCitations: 
 
 What is This?
 
- May 3, 2010 OnlineFirst Version of Record
 
- Oct 29, 2010Version of Record >> 
 at Copenhagen University Library on May 29, 2012arp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
The American Review of Public Administration
40(6) 742 –760
© The Author(s) 2010
Reprints and permission: http://www. 
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0275074010366300
http://arp.sagepub.com
Accountability 
as a Differentiated 
Value in Supranational 
Governance
Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen1
and Torben Beck Jørgensen1
Abstract
Accountability differs in its meaning, scope, and impact. Consequently, its expression as a value 
and an instrument of “good governance” differs across time within and between organizations. 
Through the prism of theories on public values, this article examines accountability as a value in 
the administration of the European Union, that is, the European Commission. The article pres-
ents a theoretical discussion of value hierarchies, causality, and conflicts. Theoretical suggestions 
are included in an empirical examination of value conflicts in the administrative reforms of the 
European executive. It is argued that organizational characteristics of the European Commission 
condition value implementation. The article finds that although accountability appears as the 
“good value per se,” its applied period is brief and its status is contradicted by conflicting values.
Keywords
European Commission, public values, accountability, administrative reforms
Theoretical and empirical studies alike recognize the importance of values in public organizations, 
public policies, and administrative reforms (Bozeman, 2007; Moore, 1995; O’Flynn, 2007; Van 
Wart, 1998). Often, public value studies investigate the status and effects of values within states 
(Beck Jørgensen, 2007; Henrichsen, in press; Van der Waal, 2008; Vrangbæk, 2009) or compara-
tively as value differences between states (Van der Waal, Pekur, & Vrangbæk, 2008) and focus 
on a multitude of values (Beck Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007). This article contributes to the litera-
ture in two distinctive ways. First, our article takes the value study beyond the state and examines 
value dynamics in the supranational polity. Second, we do not focus on several values but con-
centrate on a particular value, that is, accountability.
The reform process in the European Commission constitutes an interesting learning lab for the 
study of value changes, as the Union administration came under significant pressure in 1999. After 
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internal “whistle blowing,” the European Parliament requested an investigation of the Commission 
for corruption and fraud by a committee of independent experts. The conclusions and parliamentary 
response led to the downfall of the Santer Commission. There were calls for a more accountable 
Commission.
Given this background—strong public criticism of corrupt behavior and the selection of a new 
European Union (EU) Commission—a change toward a stronger emphasis on accountability could 
be expected to be a process marked by few problems and hindrances: The public eye is on the new 
Commission, the demand for increased accountability can hardly be characterized as controversial, 
and it is thus a good guess that the implementation of accountability is carried out smoothly. Who 
can be against?
However, this proved not to be the case. Even within a situation all focused on “good gover-
nance” reforms, various complications occurred. In this article, we look into two types of orga-
nizational complications, which may have influenced the process of value change. The organizational 
characteristics that are hypothesized to have specific implications for value changes in the Union 
administration include
•• a•high•degree•of•functional•specialization, because this organizational differentiation is 
expected to attach different meanings to accountability from one Directorate General to 
another; and
•• network•governance, because coordination through networks may in it self constitute 
problems of accountability and may further imply varying value interpretations and 
possible value conflicts.
In addition, the nature of the value in question—accountability—may also influence the process 
of value change. Stated simply, this particular value is easily understood and nobody can oppose 
it, which may explain why accountability is such a popular value.1 Furthermore, accountability is 
a very general value to the extent of being empty for any particular meaning unless interpreted in 
specific contexts. The advantage of accountability is exactly that it is (a) easily accepted and (b) may 
fit well into many contexts and situations. Indeed, accountability has become an icon of good 
governance (Bovens, 2007) and a central part of the symbolic politics (Edelman, 1964) of admin-
istrative reform. On the other hand, an open value as accountability is sensitive to pressures and 
the value may be given unintended meanings in the course of achieving accountability in an orga-
nization. Because of the absence of a firm core of meaning, accountability is also expected to be 
vulnerable to competing values.
The article is structured in three sections. The section Public Values as a Point of Departure 
undertakes the theoretical discussion of public sector values from a general perspective. We focus 
especially on how the importance of a value can be conceptualized and measured. The section, 
Accountability as a Special Case reviews accountability as a value, and theoretical suggestions are 
then included in the empirical examination of value conflicts and hierarchies in the administrative 
reforms of the European polity in the section, The European Commission: The Multi-Organizational 
Executive.
Public Values as a Point of Departure
The Concept
Value is a contested concept and there seems to be little agreement within public administration 
on how to define the concept. Some writers define values by listing concrete examples of values, 
and others by using synonyms, for example, principles, standards, ethos, and so on to pin down the 
meaning of the word (cf. Beck Jørgensen, 2007, p. 366).
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We do not add to this discussion, which also has roots long back in sociology, anthropology, 
and social psychology. Our conceptual point of departure is intentionally simple. Following Van 
Deth and Scarbrough (1995) and Hodgkinson (1996), values express “the desirable” as opposed 
to “the desired.” Public values, then, constitute ideals to be followed in the public sector, or as 
stated by Bozeman (2007, p. 17): “ the principles on which governments and policies should be 
based.” Public Value Research is thus the theoretical and empirical analysis of normative mani-
festations in the public sector, and only few political scientists would possibly not consider public 
values important in this sense. More specifically, some writers consider values important because 
they are expected to have influential consequences in that they (a) form our perceptions of reality; 
(b) give identity to individuals as well as organizations; (c) guide behavior; (d) give meaning to 
public service; and (e) are necessary for the maintenance of communities and societies (cf. Kluck-
hohn, 1962; Lawton & Rose, 1994; Maguire, 1998; Verdikommissionen, 1999). Values can also 
be regarded as important simply because they are difficult to change and change can be brought 
about only after careful deliberation (Bozeman, 2007).2
This suggests that values can be effective means of control regardless of the physical distance 
between the controller and the controlled. When first internalized or institutionalized, values can 
be the driving forces for loyal civil servants as well as terrorists and constitute their own logic of 
appropriateness. Normative power—control by values—is not soft power; it is hard-core business. 
Intended value changes are therefore likely to be resisted in the course of their implementation. 
Whether or not values do have these consequences is of course open to empirical analysis.
Values are presumably not equally important, and some may have a “lighter” nature than 
others. Especially when exploring value changes—such as upgrading accountability in the EU 
Commission—it is essential to having clear criteria on how to differentiate between strong and 
weak values. In the following, we will consider (a) the spread of values in a public organization 
or a political system and (b) relations between values.
The Spread of Values
Values may be looked for at several distinct levels or aspects of an organization or a political system. 
Inspired by models of organizational culture, we include the architecture of public buildings, artifacts, 
and symbols of all kinds (flags, uniforms, pictures, colors, etc.), organizational mission statements 
and other strategic documents, legal rules defining the purpose and responsibilities of the organiza-
tion in question, the concrete behavior of civil servants, codices for the management, decision 
making, routines and rituals, the mindsets of civil servants, organizational mechanisms and institu-
tional arrangements, and administrative reforms (Schein, 2004; Schultz, 1995; Van Wart, 1998).
A weak value can be identified only on a few of these levels. If, in particular, a value can be 
observed only in official documents written to please a critical environment whereas the organiza-
tion subscribes to other values on other levels or even tends to contradict the official value, the 
value in question can best be labeled as a window•dressing•value or façade•value. If, on the other 
hand, the value in question can be observed on all levels, then it is probably anchored in the mindsets 
of employees, carried out in concrete behavior and case decisions, supported by the structure, 
legitimized by mission statements, backed by legal rules and routines, and visualized and demon-
strated in rituals, buildings, and artifacts. In that case we label the value as a core•value.
Relations Between Values
Relations between values are important for one simple reason. If one value is in harmony with another 
it may acquire a stronger position compared with the situation where two values are in conflict. In the 
following, we will consider hierarchies of values, value causalities, and value conflicts to analytically 
address how accountability may be presented, implemented, or refused in the EU Commission.
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Value hierarchy. Some values may be viewed by actors as being more important than others.3 
To grasp the hierarchy of values, one may simply ask the relevant actors to rank the importance 
of values or analyze the emphasis values are given in the mission statements of organizations or 
as expressed in organizational behavior. For example, for a citizen, participatory•democracy may 
be viewed as more important than efficiency. Public managers, however, may disagree and find 
efficiency—at least part of the time—more important than participatory democracy. Quite pos-
sibly, both values can be viewed simultaneously as important, but it is nonetheless possible for a 
specific group of people or organizations to specify or infer a hierarchy of importance. Values can 
therefore be related to one another in terms of their relative importance. This is not to say that 
establishing a hierarchy of values is an easy task. On the contrary, choosing between conflicting 
values can be quite troublesome. If accountability is presented as a top value in a value hierarchy, 
we label accountability as a supreme•value and other values as subordinate•values.
Value causality. Values may be related to one another in the sense that they frequently appear 
simultaneously or covary. One value may have a positive effect on the other, or one value may be 
a precondition for the other. For example, it might be argued that the rule•of•law is enhanced by 
transparency. We label covarying values as co-values. Co-values can be quite troublesome for two 
reasons. First, we are making a causal claim when saying that the achievement of one value enhances 
the achievement of another value. But often we lack the necessary empirical evidence. Second, in 
some cases we may find complicated Webs of causal relations. For example, the•rule•of•law can 
also be enhanced by a value opposed to transparency, that is, secrecy, such as not making personal 
information about identifiable citizens available to the public.
A common distinction in value theory is drawn between primary values and instrumental values. 
The central feature of a primary value is that it is pursued for its own sake whereas an instrumental 
value is valued for its ability to achieve other values. Thus, if one co-value is considered a primary 
value and the other an instrumental value, then there is an imputation both of hierarchy and causality. 
If accountability is considered a supreme value and transparency a subordinate value, they are trans-
formed to primary and instrumental values if transparency can be said to enhance accountability.
Value conflicts. Standard organizational life is dense with value conflicts. For example, account-
ability toward society in general does not fit well with being responsible to the needs of individual 
users; nor does political loyalty fit well with independent professional standards. One may say that 
conflicting values are negative co-values.
It is important to note that the depth of value conflicts varies considerably:
 • Values may be in conflict, not because of their substance but only in their need for 
resources and attention. Political loyalty may render it difficult to achieve another value, 
for example, a good working environment. These two values are not—at least as abstract 
constructs—in conflict because of substance but they may be in conflict due to limited 
resources and time.
 • If the conflict is between political loyalty and independent professional standards or 
between efficiency and the rule of law, then we presumably have a conflict not only in 
terms of resources but also in terms of substance.
 • Finally, some values are antithetical. Not only are they colliding values, they are in 
language itself constructed as opposite poles on a scale, such as, secrecy–openness, 
neutrality–advocacy, and stability–innovation.
The existence of conflicting values provides a clue as to the importance of the focal value. If a 
value is surrounded by many conflicting values, it is probably highly important in terms of being 
controversial.
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How to Handle Conflicting Values
Most organizations undoubtedly subscribe to more than one value. How is the organizational value 
profile constructed if the important values are conflicting values?
The most obvious and simple way of handling value conflicts is by establishing•a•hierarchy 
between values: Value X is more important than value Y. When the accomplishment of the primary 
value X has been satisfactorily achieved, we can then consider the subordinate value Y. The establish-
ment of a value hierarchy is supposedly most easily carried out when values do not collide in content 
but only in terms of the need for resources and attention and when a causal relationship exists.
If two or more values are colliding or antithetical, value conflicts presumably cannot be solved 
by a hierarchical ordering. The most popular hypothesis regarding the outcome of value conflicts 
in such situations is undoubtedly the crowding•out•hypothesis developed by Hood (1991). Accord-
ing to this hypothesis, classical values such as legality, honesty, and integrity are replaced by modern 
efficiency values. This is a winner-takes-all hypothesis, envisaging that all public organizations 
are infused with efficiency considerations in all respects.
An important alternative is accepting that value conflicts are long-living conflicts. Both efficiency 
and legality are necessary, and both political loyalty and independent professional standards are 
important. How can public organizations cope with long-lasting value conflicts?
One option is the balancing•of•values. One strategy is the development of a capacity•to•face•
value•conflicts. This includes the development of the capacity to discuss conflicting values in 
an impersonal and disinterested manner, that is, creating meta-processes or institutions that render 
deliberation regarding conflicting values possible (Steenhuisen, Dicke, & de Bruijn, 2009).
One central aspect of value deliberations is how conflicting values can be brought closer to each 
other (a bridging strategy) or further from each other (a buffer strategy) by changing•the•interpreta-
tions•of•values. The most obvious example is the conflict between effectiveness and judicial values. 
Effectiveness can be defined broadly so as to include judicial values, just as legality and due process 
can be defined so as to include not only the correct but also a speedy answer to citizens in concrete 
cases. In a sense, one value colonizes another. Another aspect is simply keeping values ambiguous 
(Steenhuisen et al., 2009), as the formulation of clear and unambiguous values may escalate conflict 
and identify possible winners and losers.
Another option is keeping•conflicting•values•separate by sequential attention (Cyert & March, 
1963) or decoupling (Brunsson, 1989). For example, this can be done by locating conflicting values 
in different places within an organization or political system or by acknowledging certain values 
in certain periods of time.
If value conflicts are above a certain level and significant actors in the polity regard all of the 
values in conflict as central to the overall system, decoupling may be carried to the extreme, that 
is, separate organizations can be established—each acting as an independent guardian angel for 
a set of harmonious and distinct values.
Implications for the Empirical Analysis
In the analysis below, we will examine how accountability was presented to the European Com-
mission, and how the Commission subsequently responded. Was accountability presented as a 
supreme value or even as a primary value? Did the Commission managed to construct a different 
value profile? Were value conflicts deliberated and settled or did they continue as long-living 
conflicts? Here, interorganizational relations prove to be fundamental to the value changes of the 
Commission because the European Parliament becomes an important forum for control and influ-
ences the construction of an administrative value profile. However, established organizational 
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characteristics precondition internal value changes and the room to reform the organizational value 
profile. Before turning to the analysis, however, we require a deeper understanding of account-
ability as a special value.
Accountability as a Special Case
Some values are “empty” in the sense that they do not carry any meaning unless operationalized. 
Prominent examples are user•orientation (who is the user? a passenger, a patient, a tax payer?) and 
loyalty and responsiveness•(loyal and responsive toward what?) as well as accountability. Account-
ability is an especially troublesome value. Whereas loyalty and responsiveness can be exaggerated 
(accepting orders and thus bypassing ethical reasoning; following popular demands and thus 
bypassing professional standards), accountability appears to be “the good value per se.” It cannot 
be negated and nobody can be against (Bovens, 2007, p. 448). Moreover, accountability is the 
empty value par excellence, because one can be accountable to anything: to society in general, 
ethical codes, the budget department, clients, colleagues, and so on.4 Accountability is thus a value 
of diverse—some may say diffuse—meanings. It ranges from public to parliamentary, judicial, 
financial, administrative, and professional accountability.5
As noted earlier, the implementation of accountability is difficult to predict because account-
ability by its very flexibility is highly dependent on relations to other values. As Koppell (2005) 
suggests, it is a value that can only affect in full if carried out by its instrumental values, that is, 
supported by its co-values: responsibility, responsiveness, transparency, integrity, controllability, 
and rule of law.6
It also faces conflicting values. Such conflicting values could be efficiency and mutual trust. 
Accountability may hinder efficiency because the former requires more open-spaced, more red 
tape—controlled processes in which decision makers and bureaucrats are required to justify their 
actions and possibly be questioned and/or sanctioned along the way (Grøn, 2010). Mutual trust 
relations between decision makers or those set to control them may conceal who is accountable 
for decisions made (Grøn, 2010) and create a communicative space wherein decisions are not 
questioned or required justification. Thus, although often used in a rather unreflective, positive sense, 
institutionalizing the core meaning of accountability is by no means a neutral process; it crowds 
out some values while promoting others.
Because of its open nature, accountability may even be able to colonize other values by being 
defined in such a manner that other values are absorbed. For example, accountability may be defined 
as the proper use of tax payers’ money, thereby in part colonizing efficiency. The disadvantage of 
being an empty value is that other values may also colonize accountability: Being efficient is being 
accountable.
In the context of political science, accountability is tied to the core idea of representative democ-
racy. This understanding of accountability may be seen as more conventional (Steffek, 2008), 
meaning to live up to the mandate one represents and that the executive is accountable to the public. 
The co-value of this type of accountability is responsiveness. The executive accords with the 
preferences of the public (Mulgan 2000, p. 566). This understanding of accountability implies a 
rather open-spaced procedure. The institutionalization of public accountability requires publicity, 
implying a public procedure sited in an open arena (Steffek, 2008). On the other hand, judicial, 
financial, and administrative accountability can be institutionalized through procedural structures 
and ex post control. Hierarchy specifies who is accountable, judicial review examines and sanctions 
conduct, and financial auditing secures the correct use of means. These understandings of account-
ability do not necessarily depend on opening processes up to the public, but accountable conduct 
can be assured through ex post review processes, although only involving “peers” and in practice 
unfolding in rather closed spaces. The difference to the insulated nonaccountable process, however, 
is that decisions are taken under the likelihood of review and in the shadow of judicial or even 
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public control. Policy makers will anticipate ex post control by the regulated, and this will produce 
disciplined conduct (Papadopoulos, 2007, p. 471).
Because of its multiple meanings, accountability may appear rather elusive. Initially an icon of 
a good governing value (Bovens, 2007), when unfolded and applied, it becomes less the virtuous 
value and more the guidelines for governing aimed at securing accountable democratic behavior. 
Indeed, Bovens (in press) rightly suggests that accountability has two distinct meanings: as a virtue 
and as a mechanism. In the latter meaning, the concept achieves hard-core applied sense. Here, 
accountability prescribes procedures to action, according to which organizations and actors are 
obligated to explain and reason their action:
Accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an 
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgement, and the actor may face consequences. (Bovens, 2007, p. 450)
This definition has at least three important implications: (a) it implies a relationship of at least 
two, where one takes the position as the controller. There is an important point in emphasizing the 
social aspect of accountability; it cannot be assured individually or in a secluded space, but requires 
external checks and balances. The actor can both be a person or an organization, as can the forum. 
(b) Furthermore, it emphasizes communication as a vital aspect of accountability. The accountable 
must be willing to explain, give reason, and justify behavior and decisions. The forum, on the other 
hand, can raise questions without possessing further qualifications and has a right to receive answers 
and justifications. “Dialogue” is therefore a constitutive feature of accountability, involving open 
discussions and debate (Mulgan, 2000). (c) Finally, the definition implies the possibility to sanction 
misconduct. Again, this underlines that accountability is not institutionalized through internal pro-
cesses or individual reflections on correct behavior. It does not rely on a pure logic of appropriate-
ness, recognizing instead the need for actors operating within the shadow of consequence, within a 
logic of consequentiality (Papadopoulos, 2007, p. 472); misconduct will face consequences and 
eventually be sanctioned.
We will examine both meanings of accountability, that is, as both virtue and mechanism. It is 
important, however, to remember that a full-scale study of value presence and strength would 
include more that. As noted earlier, values may be looked for at several distinct levels of an orga-
nization or a political system. Nevertheless, we limit ourselves to Bovens’s (2007) two dimensions. 
First, the identification of accountability as expressed in documents and as backed by organizational 
mechanisms is a rather straightforward task. Second, a comparison between values as expressed 
in texts and values as manifested in institutional arrangements is an important element in evaluating 
the importance of values.7
The following analysis is divided into two parts. Part 1, Value Dynamics in a Differentiated 
Polity, has analyzed EU official documents treating administrative reforms and administrative 
behavior in the European Commission. The point of departure for the analysis is 1999, when heavy 
criticism of the Commission administration first began. The most relevant documents were found 
to be the early reports from the committee of independent experts to the European Parliament, 
which was subsequently addressed in a set of Commission communications on how to improve 
internal administrative behavior. The key documents examined are listed at the end of this article. 
Part 2, Value Institutionalization in Network Governance, has examined the attempts of the 
European Parliament to increase transparency regarding the expert committee system of the Com-
mission. The analysis begins in 2000, when the European parliament first demanded more informa-
tion about the existence and formation of committees and working groups under the Commission. 
The analysis includes an examination of the content and scope of the online expert register and the 
responses hereto from external observers and the European parliament in parliamentary debates 
on transparency.
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The European Commission: The Multi-Organizational Executive
As the core executive of the European Union, the European Commission is the primary locus for 
establishing and implementing the administrative values of the polity. As an organization, the 
specific characteristics of the European Commission may facilitate some value dynamics while 
hindering others. Two particular organizational characteristics appear to be relevant when assessing 
the capacity of the European administration to successfully transcend administrative value dynam-
ics: (a) the considerable functional•specialization of the Commission and (b) decision making 
through network•governance.
On•functional•specialization: The European Commission operates in a highly differentiated 
polity that has gradually extended its competences to most policy areas (Hix, 2005; Nugent, 2006). 
The internal organization of the Commission reflects the multiple functions of the polity. Thus 
divided currently into 41 General Directorates (DGs) and Services, the European administration 
is as functionally specialized as any national executive; perhaps even more so. Nevertheless, its 
hierarchically coordinating mechanisms tend to be weak, as the Commissioners have no formal 
hierarchy between them and decisions are taken under collective responsibility (Egeberg, 2007, 
p. 143). Because of the sector-specific organization of the Commission, the European executive 
is no unitary actor (Christiansen, 2001).
For an organization whose business is integration, the Commission is embarrassingly poorly 
integrated. (Metcalfe, 2000, p. 826)
Individual units develop their own bureaucratic and organizational logic (Christiansen, 2001, 
p. 751; Cram, 1994) to serve their section of European integration best and most coherently. Codes 
of conduct and administrative values are also likely to differ between and within the different sec-
tors. Initiatives intended to bring about change may be translated through sequential attention and 
local rationalities (Olsen, 2007, p. 214) instead of a cross-institutional coherent logic. The European 
administration is one of a high degree of functional specialization (Egeberg, 2006, p. 24), creating 
localized rationalities that tackle reform imperatives differently; a multi-organization rather than 
a unitary actor.
Decision•making•through•network•governance: The sector-specific division of labor within the 
Commission is fortified by the interinstitutional network coordination with national civil servants, 
representatives from interest organizations, enterprises, and experts together with other types of 
actors. In its daily operations, the European administration relies on various types of contributions 
from networks. Advisory committees, expert groups, and scientific committees provide the Com-
mission with input when preparing new initiatives, and different committees supervise the Com-
mission when it has the competence to implement European policies. By bringing together actors 
from different political and societal units, the Commission attempts to facilitate policy initiatives 
and decisions. Network governance may integrate fragmented positions and facilitate socializing 
dynamics contributing to common perceptions of how to develop a policy area. The Commission’s 
committees constitute an essential part of the EU administration and function as arenas of expert 
knowledge; arenas bringing together the national and supranational executives and mediating the 
acceptance of European regulation among central actors (Egeberg, Schaefer, & Trondal, 2006). 
The networks are thus essential to the initiating and monitoring capacity of the European executive. 
Different actors provide the Commission with different resources. Some advise the Commission 
early on the positions of governments and powerful interest organizations, and the contours of the 
necessary compromise are outlined. Others provide the Commission with expert knowledge. Com-
mission networks provide their logics of expertise to the European executive. Through the continu-
ous interaction of this governance structure and as a result of their function, the invited ones become 
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part of the multi-organization executive (Papadopoulos, 2007, p. 479). Together, they construct an 
administrative space that is rather secluded to the outsider, as to the public in general.
Value Dynamics in a Differentiated Polity
For much of its history, the European Commission has enjoyed a considerable degree of manage-
ment autonomy in the sense that no systematic review or routine control procedures were institu-
tionalized to hold the Union administration in external check (Cini, 2007, pp. 6-8). The fall of the 
Santer Commission represented a turning point.
Indeed, 1999 became a transformative year for the European Commission. Commission civil 
servant and whistle-blower Paul van Buitenen informed the European Parliament and public about 
financial misconduct, corruption, and cronyism in the Union administration (Metcalfe, 2000). 
Against this background, the European Parliament adopted a resolution intended to improve the 
financial management of the Commission.8 A committee of independent experts was established 
with the mandate to examine the financial conduct of the Commission. The Committee’s first report, 
in which the Commission’s responsibility for fraud and nepotism was detailed,9 led to the Com-
mission’s resignation. The first report was followed by a second, which included recommendations 
on how to improve internal management.10 This second report constitutes a main document in the 
formulation of which administrative values are intended to enable good governance. It is also a 
mission statement with a focus on accountability. In the reform process set off by the analysis 
and recommendation by the independent experts, accountability assumed the position as a 
supreme value, synonymous with good governance, coming to replace the former guiding values 
of “efficiency, expertise, elites and functional interest mediation” (Cini, 2007, p. 8).
The Committee’s diagnosis is clear:
The Committee considered that the codes of conduct elaborated by the Commission remain 
insufficient and are not yet backed up by the necessary legal framework. The attribution of 
responsibilities and chain of delegation between the Commission, single commissioners and 
the departments are ill-defined and ill-understood by those concerned. Finally, the concepts 
of political responsibility and accountability remain unclear and the mechanisms for their 
practical application inadequate. (Second report, p. 23)
The centrality of accountability to tackle the management deficit of the Commission is empha-
sized throughout the document and treated in detail in Chapter 7 of the report, addressing “integrity, 
responsibility and accountability in European political and administrative life.” To (re)establish 
an accountable Commission, hierarchy assuring a clear chain of delegation and transparency 
become pivotal means.
As regards hierarchy, the committee calls for clarity on responsibilities. The commissioner is 
“responsible for” policy formulation and the implementation of policy by their department, and 
they are to “be answerable to” the Commission as a whole and “accountable to” the European 
Parliament.11 It is also pointed out that the officials in the individual departments must answer to 
their director general, who in turn is accountable to the commissioner in question. Hierarchy and 
the division of administrative tasks and legislative oversight by the European Parliament are all 
intended to reestablish accountability.
Transparency is another key instrument for achieving accountability. The committee’s evalua-
tion found that the Commission as a whole is based on a culture of secrecy. Mediating a culture of 
openness therefore requires internal and external checks and balances. First, it is pointed out that 
there must be room for legislative oversight. Institutional accountability vis-à-vis the European 
Parliament is the Commission’s duty, both positively, that is, giving account, and negatively, being 
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held accountable (second report, p. 111). Second, the role of an active and independent press is 
recognized. Without an active press, a vital intermediator to push the EU administration for infor-
mation and openness is missing. Third, the Commission must establish a culture in which commission 
civil servants can act as whistle-blowers and expose misconduct. A code of conduct sanctioning 
the inner critical voice will promote wrongdoings and malaise. An administrative space lacking 
external spectators and room for internal critique is likely to be a space of secrecy.
In sum, the committee of independent experts sets out accountability as the supreme value for 
tackling the management deficits of the European Commission. In their recommendations, they 
present a different primary value than the established value hierarchy in the European adminis-
tration, which previously has emphasized efficiency, expertise, and functional interest mediation 
(Cini, 2007, p. 8). Accountability runs through the mission statement as a value unto itself, that 
is, a primary value, resembling Bovens’ (in press) accountability as a “virtue.” However, it is not 
presented as a virtue alone, but also as a mechanism to be operationalized by a set of co-values. 
The document sets out a clear strategy to be followed, recognizing the inter- and intrainstitutional 
or contextual relationship of accountability, only successfully instrumentalized if supported by 
internal structures (hierarchy), external insight and oversight (transparency and control), and a 
responsive culture allowing for critique (communicative space). The recommendations made by 
the independent experts emphasize the need to establish a value hierarchy and to explicate the 
priorities between values.
The document bears important insights into the empirical study of value statements and dynam-
ics. It is a statement that is explicit in the hierarchy of values, while at the same time recognizing 
value conflicts in the administrative polity of the Union. Accountability is given relative primacy 
to efficiency, and the group of independent experts clearly finds the need to prioritize accountability 
to efficiency. By not giving the two values equal emphasis, the group recognizes that the two values 
may collide; however, they are not presented as antithetical. Room must be given to both, though 
not on equal footing in the reform process. An accountable Commission is called for more than an 
efficient Commission.
The Commission followed up on the work of the experts with its own action plan.12 In the action 
plan, accountability is one of the first objectives referred to in the reform (action plan, p. 3). How-
ever, the value is primarily presented in a broad, nonoperationalized form, the meaning of which 
is not specified but said to encapsulate the various objectives in the reform program. No mechanisms 
are attached. In this manner, the action plan contrasts with the previous recommendations. Despite 
the supremacy of accountability in the work of the independent experts, it is only sparsely mentioned 
in the action plan document.13 Instead, the co-value of transparency is now given greater importance 
than accountability, though the strategy is diffused into two forms: (a) to increase openness through 
increased stakeholder dialogue, essentially meaning in semi-closed, consultative processes; and 
(b) to establish e-communication with the public.
Nevertheless, the main part of the document addresses how to realize more efficient Commis-
sion management. Below the headlines, efficiency takes over as the supreme value in the action 
plan.14 The strategy is to increase administrative efficiency by more cost-effective use of means; 
by delegating/externalizing noncore activities; by decentralizing decision making and management-
related services; and by prioritizing between the many different tasks the Commission must carry 
out. These reform initiatives should result in a leaner, more efficient Union administration.
The action plan represents a clear departure from the value hierarchy recommended by the 
independent experts. Accountability is merely mentioned as one value among other central values. 
It has no supreme value status, and the text does not operationalize it with a set of co-values that 
will be instrumental to a more accountable Commission. As such, accountability stands as the 
empty value. Instead, efficiency and transparency are emphasized throughout the document, without 
addressing how the two values are to balance one another or whether transparency may be in 
conflict with efficiency.
 at Copenhagen University Library on May 29, 2012arp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
752  The American Review of Public Administration 40(6)
The 2001 White Paper on “European Governance” is a subsequent mission statement, often 
mentioned as the core document on good governance in the EU reform process. It represents a core 
script from the Commission on how to tackle the Union’s democratic and management deficits. In 
the White Paper, the Commission explicitly sets out what it understands as the principles—the 
values—underpinning good governance:
Five principles underpin good governance and the changes proposed in this White Paper: open-
ness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. (White Paper–2001, p. 10)
Although the five values are presented as equals, three are granted clear priority throughout the 
document: openness, participation, and effectiveness. These three values are not regarded as com-
peting, but rather as harmonious values. Openness and participation are to be ensured through a 
dual strategy: online information to the public and enhanced functional consultation with interest 
groups when proposing new legislation. The Commission hereby intends to open up on policy 
processes by, on the one hand, providing information to everyone on the Europe Web site and, on 
the other hand, by creating a more balanced culture of consultation in its network structure. To 
accomplish the latter, the Commission finds it necessary to develop a code of conduct, “focusing 
on what to consult on, when, whom and how to consult” (White Paper–2001, p. 17). Furthermore, 
the use of expert advice should be made more transparent (White Paper–2001, p. 19).
Despite the prominence given to openness and participation, efficiency constitutes the supreme 
value of the statement. Greater effectiveness is to be achieved by “better policies, regulation and 
delivery” (White Paper–2001, p. 19). Effectiveness runs through the document as the primary 
concern, attached as a value to all parts of the Commission’s strategy. The legislative process should 
be speeded up; community law should be simplified; regulatory agencies must ensure that EU rules 
are applied and enforced in a better manner.
Although stated as a value of concern, accountability does not take position as such. Instead, it 
is mentioned as a concept with no mechanisms attached. Compared with its previous status in the 
independent expert recommendation, it now merely pops up as a facade value rather than an impera-
tive to enforce real change. Instead, efficiency has (re-)gained supreme status. The White Paper 
does not address how to establish intrainstitutional accountability in its internal executive structures, 
as requested by the independent experts; instead, it presents interinstitutional strategies about how 
to institutionalize the co-value of openness as well as the conflicting values of functional participa-
tion and effectiveness. The status of accountability is that of a diffuse concept with no applied 
meaning; it is more an elusive concept used to fill out the positive connotations of other values.
The value dynamics in the early part of the Commission’s reform process can thus be divided 
in two. In the first part, accountability is introduced as the new important value. It is granted supreme 
status to accomplish good governance. Accountability is encircled by the value cluster of the 
instrumental co-values of transparency, responsiveness, participation, and controllability. In the 
second part, however, other sets of values have come to overshadow the establishment of good 
governance. In the value conflict between efficiency and accountability, the Commission’s own 
reading on what is desirable promotes the former over the latter. Participation is also reframed from 
civic participation to the functional participation of stakeholders. Finally, the Commission presents 
a value universe as if conflicts do not exist, though it is evident that the practical implementation 
of the different supreme and co-values contain tensions and contradictions.
In practical terms, a reform strategy is presented according to which causal dynamics will 
contradict one another and organizational characteristics are likely to diffuse the value orientation 
of the polity. The two values may not be antithetical in themselves, but they conflict strongly in 
the reform process on good governance because their co-values clash in both their need for atten-
tion and in substance. The values instrumental to efficiency contradict the values that are instru-
mental to accountability.
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Value Institutionalization in Network Governance
Another organizational characteristic in the European polity with a plausible causal effect for value 
dynamics is that of network governance. The web of Commission committees coordinates the many 
actors assisting the Union administration to realize its policy objective and to manage a system of 
functional specialization and diverse preferences. Network governance constitutes a core part of 
the EU multi-organizational executive. The operating capacity of the Commission largely depends 
on its ability to bring together the viewpoints of experts, stakeholders, and member state civil servants 
in order to consolidate and legitimize a policy proposal by gaining ex ante approval from the relevant 
voices. Without this ex ante approval, the likelihood of efficient and successful decision making 
is assumed to decrease significantly. Network governance constitutes a prerequisite for efficiency. 
From the perspective of legitimacy, this means of governing is linked to output legitimacy, focusing 
on results, enabling compromise, and deliberating consensus between stakeholders and experts of 
different positions and preferences. It is thus an essential structure for the Commission to “upgrade 
the common interest.” However, it is only an arena for invited players.
Although network governance may enable efficiency, it has strong implications for account-
ability. By inviting actors from different settings and with different mandates into the policy process, 
responsibility is shared among a greater number of hands, competences are diffused, and the origin 
of policy choices becomes less clear. When responsibility is shared, it likely becomes diluted 
(Papadopoulos, 2007). When consensus is deliberated in arenas with continuous dialogue, the 
moment and specific reasoning in the making of a decision becomes blurred. Transparency as the 
co-value to accountability is not part of the way networks operate.
As a means to govern, networks are at odds with the value of accountability as defined by Bovens 
(2007). Network participants are presumably included on equal footing, that is, in a nonhierarchical 
manner. There is no controlling forum or actor within the network providing internal oversight, 
and the external checks and balances are not formally institutionalized. Such forums of control 
would hinder the efficiency of policy making. Furthermore, dialogue unfolds between experts or 
those with the requested mandate in a space of closure, whereas networks are not accessible spaces 
to the public. Mutual understanding regarding a policy problem or reform is deliberated between 
“peers” but not necessarily explained or justified to the public. Furthermore, the external observer 
to network results and logics hardly has the necessary qualifications to pose correct and meaningful 
questions, which evidently hinders them when subsequently passing judgment. This partly deter-
mines the ability of the legislator to sanction expert decisions taken in networks. Formally, repre-
sentative forums have the authority to nullify decisions prepared in networks (Papadopoulos, 2007, 
p. 474). In practice, however, it may be difficult indeed to veto a prepared network decision heavily 
backed by expert reasoning and the “mandate of insiders’ knowledge.” Questioning the premises 
for decisions and reasoning logics requires communicative resources and expert knowledge that 
somehow matches the network governors. Without the ability to question, sanctioning network-
based decision making becomes a difficult task.
Essentially, establishing accountability in the network governance of the EU administration 
requires institutionalized checks and balances that live up to the three premises in Boven’s (2007) 
Value Conflicts in the European Commission
Supreme value Accountability Efficiency
Co-values Transparency Management closure
 Civic participation Functional participation
 Controllability Expert deliberation
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definition. First, network actors must be identifiable. It must be possible to open up the multi-
organization executive to the extent where membership becomes identifiable. Furthermore, formal 
or informal forums must be willing and able to assume the role as controller. The European Parlia-
ment is a forum of control that is rapidly growing in importance in the European polity. Parliamentary 
questioning and control with executive arenas for decision making plays a pivotal role in establishing 
accountability. Moreover, the press constitutes an important informal forum to communicate the 
relevance of issues and decisions to the public and the parliamentarians, thus enabling them to pose 
questions and pass judgments. The role of “investigative journalism” (Cini, 2007, pp. 35-36) is thus 
another instrument vital to establishing accountability. Second, sufficient premises for communica-
tion must be present. Dialogue is hindered between those not speaking the same expert “language,” 
sharing the same expert reasoning, or having the same code of specialization. Third, the competence 
and strength to sanction a prepared network decision must exist. The capacity to sanction requires 
the two previous premises; a strong forum and the ability to question/enter into dialogue.
Implementing the values of good governance in the network structure of the EU multi-
organizational executive is therefore a process of imminent challenges and potent conflicts. The 
conflict between the two different value hierarchies in the mission statements analyzed above 
comes out sharp in the attempts to reform the committee structure in the European administration. 
On the one hand, network governance is meant to bring about efficiency in a complex institutional 
setting by bridging different viewpoints, assign responsibilities to stakeholders and bring expert-
based mandates to the execution of European power. By bringing in the instrumental values of 
expertise and functional participation, the supreme value of efficiency is more likely to be achieved. 
On the other hand, however, accountability and its instrumental values are crowded out by the 
creation of an administrative space of closure.
The European Parliament has addressed this conflict in its attempt to gain information about 
the expert committee system in the European Commission and open it up. Since early 2000, the 
Parliament has demanded information about the committees and working groups working under 
the Commission. The European legislature has criticized the executive for extreme secrecy. In 
2004, the newly appointed Barroso Commission responded to this criticism and submitted a list 
to the European Parliament of the expert groups and advisory boards operating under the individual 
DGs (“List of Expert Groups and Other Advisory Bodies 2004”).15 However, the list was soon 
criticized for not being exhaustive and not specifying the function of the networks or their 
membership.
In 2005, an online register of expert groups followed.16 In the explanatory note to the register, 
the Commission explains that the purpose of expert groups is to assist the Commission in propos-
ing EU legislation or carrying out monitoring and coordinating tasks; that is, assisting it in its 
governing and administrative functions. The Commission also declares that expert groups may 
consist of national experts, or stakeholders from the business world, nongovernmental organiza-
tions, trade unions, academia, and so on.17 At the time of writing (May 2009), 983 expert groups 
are listed. The count attests to the variation within the Commission in the use of expert groups. 
The DG for Taxation and Custom Union uses expert groups the most, with 114 registered expert 
groups, closely followed by the DG for Enterprise and Industry (99 expert groups listed). At the 
other end of the scale, DG Budget listed only two expert groups, and DG Communication only 
registered one expert group.
As regards accountability, the online register may be regarded as a step in the right direction. 
However, the information on individual expert groups remains crude. The register provides infor-
mation regarding groups of participants, but not by name or specific organizations. The register 
thus increases transparency as to whether a network only consists of national authorities or jointly 
with business organizations, nongovernmental organizations, academics, and so on. But it does not 
specify the composition or responsibilities of the network.
 at Copenhagen University Library on May 29, 2012arp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Martinsen and Beck Jørgensen 755
The register has been criticized for being neither exhaustive nor up-to-date (Alter-EU 2008). 
In 2008, the “Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics in the European Union,” Alter-EU, 
conducted an analysis of the functions and compositions of the Commission’s experts groups. 
It found that information about the names of group members, reports, and minutes from meetings 
were very difficult to access.
Although the Commission has stated its commitment to providing the names of the experts in 
its networks and EP members have repeatedly requested the Union administration to provide more 
information, this has not yet happened.18 The work methods, participants, responsibilities, and 
decisions made remain inaccessible information.
Whereas the degree of closure surrounding a network has not diminished significantly, their 
total number as consultative forums to the Commission has increased. Alter-EU 2008 (p. 7) notes 
that the total number of expert groups has increased by 40% since 2000. Furthermore, increased 
functional representation constitutes a central aspect of the Commission’s mission statements 
(Smisman, 2004; Commission White Paper–2001). According to the Commission, increasing 
civic participation essentially means allowing stakeholders/functional participants into the policy 
process, as the analysis above demonstrates.
Just as mission statements express value conflicts and ambiguity, as analyzed in the section 
Value Dynamics in a Differentiated Polity, so does the implementation of values in network 
governance. The attempts to open up the consultative forums of the Union administration accentu-
ate the organizational rigidity of a system in which the traditional values of efficiency and expert-
mandated decisions remain primary values. In terms of the three accountability premises included 
in Boven’s (2007) definition, the online register in its current form does not come close to imple-
menting the administrative value: (a) Network actors are unidentifiable, meaning that the public 
and their parliamentary representatives cannot control the forums for decision making they cannot 
access. (b) The insulation of network governance means that external observers cannot question 
or request justification regarding policy advice and decisions in which the origin and responsible 
part are unidentifiable. (c) Sanctions are prevented in unidentifiable decision-making arenas.
Embedded in the organizational features of network governance, accountability has a long way 
to come to successfully be implemented as the supreme value of the Union administration. Instead, 
network governance aims to promote efficiency, and its central co-values of management closure, 
functional participation, and expert deliberation contradict the instrumental content of account-
ability. Whereas the established supreme value of efficiency and its co-values such as functional 
participation and expert deliberation may lose attention and status for a while, they have strong 
organizational platforms from which to regain importance.
Concluding Remarks
The conducted study of value dynamics in the EU executive points out that it is far easier to pres-
ent a new, important value than it is to implement it. Although it may be relatively simple to point 
out accountability as the new supreme value of a European Commission in crisis, the organizational 
characteristics of the European executive condition—and essentially hinder—its implementation. 
Accountability is indeed present in the Commission’s reform strategy, but although it is stated as 
a virtue, it is not applied as the mechanism of good governance.
The examination of value implementation has revealed that although the context of crisis ought 
to favor a smoother implementation, established and conflicting values act as barriers. In a supra-
national organization striving to deliver results, efficiency constitutes the value most embedded 
in the rationale and organizational logic of the supranational administration. The Commission’s 
mission statements present an ambiguous value universe with incoherent value priorities. Co-values 
are presented as if conflict does not exist between them; civic participation and transparency on 
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the one hand, functional participation and management closure on the other. This conflict and 
contradiction is further demonstrated through network governance. Whereas accountability requires 
the co-values of transparency, civic participation, and controllability, the co-values of efficiency 
manifesting in network governance contrast in sheer form by requiring management closure, 
functional participation, and expert deliberation.
In the reform of the European Commission, accountability has never reached position as supreme 
value and the period, where it gets full attention and resources, is indeed brief. The Commission 
did not follow the full set of recommendations from the independent experts regarding account-
ability and did not manage to construct a different value profile. This does not mean that the Com-
mission has not learned from previous experiences. Improvements have been made, as for example 
demonstrated by greater financial accountability and the publication of the online expert register.
This suggests that in a multi-organization, organizational characteristics, for example, functional 
specialization and network governance—strongly condition value dynamics, and value conflicts 
are likely to continue as long-lasting conflicts. But it also brings the role of interorganizational 
relations to the fore. The Commission itself proves weak to establish a new value profile and soon 
falls back to the established value hierarchy in the daily practice of governance. But legislative 
oversight continues to criticize and place pressure on the Union core executive. The European 
Parliament therefore proves to be fundamental to the value dynamics of the Commission; on the 
one hand, likely to gradually improve what it finds to be unaccountable modes of governance; on 
the other hand, unlikely to crowd out conflicting values, as they are strongly embedded in the 
organizational characteristics of the Commission. Value conflicts are thus likely to be (long-)lasting 
and continue to struggle for attention.
Such conflict may represent a more fundamental aspect of contemporary value universes. As 
Bovens (2007) tells us, accountability as a mechanism relies on communication. Perhaps the com-
municative aspect of accountability is what supranational and late modern governance in general 
have significant difficulty providing. Despite a general call for deliberation and transparency, late 
modern governance proceeds in secluded, specialized arenas of decision making. Such specialized 
arenas are founded on a high degree of closure, inaccessible to the nonexpert and whoever does 
not speak the same language code as those invited. Efficiency requirements inhibit translation from 
expert codes to the general public. As demonstrated in the present case, it therefore becomes vital 
that controlling forums function, pose questions, and demand reasoning. In the context of the EU, 
the European Parliament and investigative journalism prove to be fundamental forums for securing 
accountability. Such forums are vital for securing some sort of balance in a value universe beyond 
the state in which supreme and co-values strive for attention. As such, they offer a very good example 
of using organizational decoupling to keep conflicting values separate. Even the good value 
per se—accountability—faces many hindrances in terms of being manifest both as a virtue and a 
mechanism in a value universe in which conflicting supreme values have stronger platforms from 
which to dominate due to established organizational characteristics and means of governance.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the implementation of values cannot rely only on reform 
documents, mission statements, and formal control mechanisms. In the long run, accountability—if 
a primary value—must be part of the recruitment, socialization, and promotion practices and must 
therefore be anchored in the mindsets of EU civil servants. Just as public service motivation appears 
to be an important intrinsic driver in the behavior of national civil servants (Perry & Hondeghem, 
2008; Vandenabeele, 2008), so also intrinsic commitment to accountability has a role to play in 
the EU Commission. Otherwise, the implementation of accountability relies only on extrinsic 
motivation.
The case of accountability in the EU Commission demonstrates that the transformation of an 
organizational value profile is a very tricky task. Two points can be made. First, the installment of 
accountability partly fails despite what appear to be highly optimal conditions: (a) the overarching 
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context is a major crisis, public criticism, and an unavoidable demand for a serious response; and 
(b) the value in question—accountability—is a nonnegatible value and has even become a widespread 
icon of good governance. Thus, the transformation of organizational value profiles under less optimal 
conditions will clearly not be easy. Second, accountability is up against numerous hindrances: 
(a) the organizational characteristics of the EU Commission—functional specialization and network 
governance—do not in themselves favor accountability; (b) efficiency has long been institutionalized 
in the Commission, not only as a supreme value but also as a primary value backed by several co-
values; and (c) accountability as an empty value is vulnerable in conflict with other values.
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Notes
 1. An inspection of a sample of codices for public servants from around the world revealed that account-
ability was the most central value followed by values such as legality and transparency (Beck Jørgensen 
& Sørensen, IN PRESS)
 2. The impact of values can be included in the definition of value, cf. Kluckhohn (1962, p. 395). We avoid 
that because it is awkward to include a causal relationship in a definition when the relationship itself 
should be left open to empirical analysis.
 3. A more detailed discussion of value relations can be found in Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman (2007).
 4. Van der Waal (2007) uses “accountability towards relevant stakeholders” in an empirical investigation of 
government and business organizations, which makes the concept both flexible and deprived of precise 
meaning.
 5. As Bovens (IN PRESS) mentions, accountability is an essentially contested and contestable con-
cept. A growing body of literature discusses accountability and its various meanings. See Bovens (IN 
PRESS) and Erkkilä (2007) for overview and references.
 6. This more or less covers the meanings attached to accountability mentioned by the scholars defining the 
concept. Koppell (2005) operates with five dimensions of accountability: transparency, liability, control-
lability, responsibility, and responsiveness.
 7. This conceptualization is parallel to writings on value in which a distinction is drawn between a value 
(virtue) and the institutional arrangements (mechanisms) necessary to safeguard the value in question 
(Beck Jørgensen, 2009; de Bruijn & Dicke, 2006).
 8. The resolution was adopted by the European Parliament on January 14, 1999.
 9. Committee of Independent Experts first report on allegations regarding fraud, mismanagement, and 
nepotism in the European Commission, March 15, 1999.
10. Second report on Reform of the Commission Analysis of current practice and proposals for tackling 
mismanagement, irregularities, and fraud: September 10, 1999.
11. Responsible, answerable, and accountable are used in a rather synonymous manner by the Committee of 
Independent Experts.
12. COM (2000) 200, final. “Reforming the Commission. A White paper—part II. Action plan,” March 1, 2000.
13. To be specific, different uses of “accountability” is mentioned 10 times in the 70-page long document.
14. The document mentions “effective” 37 times, “efficient” 22 times, and “efficiency” 6 times. The different 
concepts for “effectiveness” are used interchangeably and do not appear to have separate meaning.
15. The list can be found on www.j.dk/images/bondes/Bonde-listen.pdf
16. See http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?lang=EN
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17. See http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/faq/faq.cfm?aide=2
18. See, for example, Parliamentary Debate on Financial Transparency, February 18, 2008, in which the ques-
tion pertaining to extended information about expert groups was raised. See also the subsequently adopted 
resolution, “European Parliament resolution of 19 February 2008 on transparency in financial matters” 
(P6_TA (2008) 0051), especially note 34. For reference to other debates, see Alter-EU 2008, p. 5.
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